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LETTER DATED 5 JULY 1997 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF ERITREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to forward a letter addressed to you from Mr. Haile Woldensae, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Eritrea, concerning an aborted assassination plot by the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime of the Sudan on Mr. Isaias Afwerki, President of Eritrea.

Considering the seriousness of the matter, I fervently request that the Council take this up in a sense of urgency.

I should be grateful if you would kindly circulate this letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Tesfa Alem SEYOUM
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Annex

Letter dated 4 July 1997 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to Article 35 of the Charter of the United Nations, I am writing this to bring to the attention of the Security Council an aborted international crime plotted by the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime of the Sudan that, had it succeeded, would have had grave consequences for national and international security.

On 20 April 1997, my Government uncovered, with deepest grief, the NIF regime's plot to assassinate Mr. Isaias Afwerki, President of Eritrea, thus violating the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and rules of international law.

In a confession, made under no duress, Captain Nasreddin Babikir Aba al-Khairat, the Sudanese officer charged with the terrorist mission, said that the assassination was planned to be carried out by Captain al-Khairat himself by way of infiltration into the Sudanese opposition coalition, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) to Eritrea on 14 November 1996. Captain al-Khairat further testified that this international crime was conceived at the highest levels of the NIF regime, with the direct involvement of senior government officials including:

- Sheikh Hassan al-Turabi, President of the Sudanese Parliament and leader of the NIF;
- General Omar Al Beshir, Head of State of the NIF regime;
- Ghazi Salahadin, Secretary-General of the National Congress;
- Nafi Ali Nafi, Minister of Agriculture and Head of Security in the NIF.

Captain al-Khairat is a member of the Sudanese General Security Services. A veteran of the Sudanese army since 1982, Captain al-Khairat was handpicked by the NIF in 1991 to receive training for six months with 38 other "Mujahidin" from a number of foreign countries. Hamza Musthofa, the Egyptian terrorist wanted for the assassination attempt on President Mubarak, was part of this group. In 1994, al-Khairat received additional training with a smaller elite group at the headquarters of the Sudanese Security Services for three months on execution of assassinations, the handling of explosives, kidnappings, car accidents and other various subversive activities under the notorious international terrorist, Carlos, then known to the group by his code-name of Sheikh al-Hussein.

Before his assignment to the operation in Eritrea, Captain al-Khairat, now accepted as the "169th officer of the NIF's most committed cadres", carried out covert missions to Chad and the Central African Republic in 1994 and November 1995, respectively.

The assassination mission in Eritrea was planned to be executed by Captain al-Khairat alone, although other subversive support groups were also dispatched from Khartoum at the same time. This option was preferred because Ghazi Salahadin - one of the senior NIF leaders involved in the plot - had argued that the NIF "should learn from the mistakes made in the attempted killing of Mubarak in Addis Ababa". Security precautionary measures that may have been taken by the Government of Eritrea and the absence of Islamic philanthropic organizations that could provide suitable cover for a large contingent were also invoked by Salahadin and other officers planning the operation for choosing this course of action.

The operation was meticulously planned to include contingency "confessions" by Captain al-Khairat to absolve the NIF regime of any involvement in the event of his capture or abortion of the mission. The Captain was given 30 April 1997 as the deadline to execute the operation and to return to Khartoum by 10 May at the latest. In case of his capture, Khartoum would release the "confession" that was recorded on videotape upon the direct instructions of Brigadier General Salah Bosh on 12 November, just two days before his departure. The fictitious "confession" on this tape purported to establish that:

- Al-Khairat was an agent of the NDA sent to kill General Omar Al Beshir during his visit to the Central African Republic in the month of Ramadan in January 1996;

- The plot was planned, supported and instigated by the Egyptians;

- Yassir Arman (the spokesman of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army in Asmara) was their contact point;

- The group was arrested along the border between the Central African Republic and the Sudan.

The fabricated narration on the tape further portrays al-Khairat as being released from prison after eight months of detention.

Captain al-Khairat's cover was exposed by the NDA on 20 April. In addition to detailed information on the plot to assassinate President Isaias, Captain al-Khairat has further confirmed the subversive and terrorist-sponsoring activities of the NIF regime that include, inter alia, training camps for what it calls the Eritrean Jihad in the camps of Girba, Faw and Mahata 11 in eastern Sudan, for the Ugandan Lords Resistance Army in Juba, for Egyptian Jihad at Abu Sembel and for Chadian Mujahidin around Ansero.

The NIF's incontrovertible involvement in a heinous plot to assassinate yet another Head of State is an additional testimony to the boundless limits that this rogue regime is prepared to take to pursue its objectives of subversion, terror and destabilization. The assassin indeed confessed that the primary motive behind the assassination plot was "to bring about political confusion in Eritrea that would benefit the interests of the NIF".

This is in fact the gravity underpinning the whole matter. As the Government of Eritrea repeatedly reminded the Security Council in previous

years - in letters to the Security Council dated 3 and 31 January and 1 April 1994 - these "interests" are the NIF's avowed objectives of survival by destabilizing, through blatant acts of subversion and terrorism, its neighbours and the continent at large. The NIF thus continues to perpetrate acts of international lawlessness, in violation of all accepted norms of State behaviour, to destabilize regional security, as well as to harbour and instigate international terrorism.

It is with these subversive strategies in mind that the NIF regime created an international terrorist organization under the banner of the Popular and Arabic Islamic Conference (PAIC) in April 1991 in Khartoum under the chairmanship of the NIF leader, Sheikh Hassan al-Turabi. Secret resolutions of the PAIC in 1995 stated, inter alia, that "this year shall witness the fall of a number of regimes in the Horn of Africa" as the extremist forces that it sponsored "were gaining ground".

The NIF's acts of interference in the internal affairs of Eritrea go back to the early years of seizure of power in the Sudan by this illegal regime. And for the past eight years, its acts of unprovoked subversion and hostility have continued to escalate in spite of the Government of Eritrea's efforts to persuade the NIF to desist from its belligerent behaviour. To cite a few cases from its repeated provocative acts:

- From 1992 to 1997, the NIF regime recruited, largely through coercion, hundreds of Eritreans from the refugee camps for military and security training at Al-Rahad and other camps near the city of Ghedarf and Kassala;

- It facilitated repeated incursions of these units across the border into Eritrea for subversive acts of landmine planting and wanton attacks against civilian targets;

- The mercenary units often included Sudanese, Afghans, Moroccans, Tunisians and other assorted terrorists from various countries;

- The NIF regime further launched its "Sudanization project" to coerce Eritrean refugees targeted for its sinister designs to accept Sudanese nationality;

- Sudanese security authorities resorted to extensive harassment and intimidation campaigns in the refugee camps to detain and interrogate those who resisted its wayward tactics.

If this letter is deemed to be lengthy, it is because my Government wanted to emphasize to the Security Council, as it has in the past, that international peace and security are threatened by the inappropriate behaviour of the regime in the Sudan. It is the conviction of my Government that the NIF regime in Khartoum will not stop committing the same or similar crimes unless the international community takes the necessary action to stop it. The attempt by the NIF to assassinate the Head of the State of Eritrea while it has a pending case in the United Nations for complicity in a similar act indeed demonstrates its utter contempt of international conventions and institutions. The laxity

with which the unacceptable excesses of the NIF regime have been tolerated in the past must therefore be tightened and prompt action taken to stem its illegal activities.

Under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, which came into force in February 1977 and to which the Sudan is a State party, assassination attempts or plots against a Head of State are international crimes, and the commission of such crimes is a matter of grave concern to the international community.

The assassination plot by the NIF regime on President Isaias is an act of international terrorism that violates the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 1994, in which it is stated that "States, guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant rules of international law, must refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts, in territories of other States ...".

Furthermore, by engaging itself in this criminal act, the Government of the Sudan has neglected the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted on 24 October 1970, which reiterates the above.

Finally, in the interest of peace and security, on behalf of the Government of Eritrea, I call upon the Security Council to take appropriate action against the NIF regime of the Sudan without further delay.

(Signed) Haile WOLDENSAC
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Enclosure I

Statement by Eritrea to the thirty-second session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity

Allow me to share with you, through this written submission, the subversive acts of destabilization that the National Islamic Front regime in the Sudan is perpetrating to foment trouble in our region, and the continent at large. I wish to emphasize from the outset that we are not raising this issue at this august assembly because we seek to solicit action at the level of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), but simply to share with our sisterly countries the evidence we have collected throughout the years.

For the past seven years, the NIF has pursued a strategy of regional expansion and destabilization that has provoked tension with most of its neighbours. The NIF's flagrant violation of international norms of behaviour and its sponsorship of international terrorism have in fact prompted the United Nations to impose diplomatic sanctions against the Sudan which are subject to review in the coming months.

As you will recall, the third meeting of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention had earlier urged the NIF regime to desist from providing sanctuary to terrorist elements and to abide by the Charters of the United Nations and OAU in its relations with its neighbours.

The Sudan has also been accused and strongly condemned by the international community for practising slavery and ethnic cleansing against its second-class citizens in the Nuba mountains and the south as a whole.

One of the instruments that the NIF regime has employed to conduct its acts of subversion and terrorism has been the so-called Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC) that it established for the purpose. The PAIC, which was founded in April 1991 in Khartoum, brings together extremist groups from 71 States.

The PAIC seeks to provide organizational, political, military and financial support to these groups in their bid to destabilize societies and seize power through violence in line with the short- and long-term strategies it adopts at its periodic conferences, most of which are kept secret and confidential. I shall proceed, next, to cite relevant excerpts from those documents.

The internal and secret memorandum adopted in the founding conference in 1991 defines the establishment of Governments along the inspirations and image of the NIF regime as one of the key strategic aims of the organization. To this end, the PAIC would focus on Algeria, the Niger, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Chad, Senegal, Tunisia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Africa, Palestine and the Gulf States as operational theatres in the immediate future, while drawing up new plans to create favourable situations in both Iraq and Egypt. The Sudan would be used as a springboard for the realization of these extremist aims.

The PAIC went beyond this broad strategy to draw up concrete plans for subversive action in its subsequent conference held at Khartoum in the first quarter of 1995. In this vein, eight central offices were set up in various capitals that were charged with the express tasks of coordinating political activities and designing terrorist operations, as well as preparing strategic studies and collecting funds. These were:

- The San'a Office to supervise the activities of extremist movements in the Gulf region;

- The Mogadiscio Office to supervise such activities in the Horn of Africa region;

- The Khartoum Office to supervise subversive acts in Uganda, Kenya, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

- The Rome Office, with operational jurisdiction over extremist groups in the Maghreb States;

- The Karachi Office to supervise activities in Afghanistan and Albania;

- The Tehran Office for supervision of operations in the Central Asian countries, as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

- The London Office to handle the task of strategic studies, publication of information and dissemination of literature;

- The New York Office with the main responsibility of fund-raising.

While the capability of the PAIC to implement these baneful programmes of destabilization cannot be overstated, one cannot at the same time underestimate the geographic expanse of its organizational tentacles and the carnage that the NIF regime is prepared to unleash so irresponsibly if it carries the day.

The fourth conference of the PAIC further called, in its seven-point resolution, for subversive acts to torpedo the peace talks in the Middle East and for the intensification of its operations in the Gulf States so as "to bring about the rule of Islamic Mujahidin in the region". For its sinister designs in the Horn of Africa, the resolution reveals:

> "The conference takes note of the wind of change that has started to blow in Africa, and especially in the Horn region, where Islamic movements have dug their feet in, gaining strength and momentum despite the fierce attack of crusade they are facing ... The Muslims have risen in the North of Uganda ... The Kenyan Islamic Party has become an active and effective influence in the Kenyan arena ... while Islamic movements have become active in Ethiopia, with 1 million Muslims demanding the imposition of Sharia Law for the constitution of a Muslim (Ethiopian) nation in a recent public demonstration ... In Eritrea, the Islamic Jihad movement has organized its ranks and united its efforts. Its military operations have started to bear fruit ...".

The resolution further exhorts its members: "our sacred duty impels us to extend full support to these Islamic movements ... With the help of God and his guidance, Islam will return back shortly to the Horn of Africa and this year shall witness the fall of a number of regimes before the overwhelming Islamic tide".

I should perhaps underline here that the reference to Islam and Islamic societies has no religious basis. If the NIF and its assorted collaborators often seek to legitimize their subversive acts through evoking Islam, this is a cheap political manipulation that has nothing to do with the teachings of the Koran. Islam is in fact a very tolerant religion which has coexisted in harmony with other faiths for centuries, especially in the Horn of Africa, a region of ancient cultures and diverse religions.

Khartoum has not only hosted the PAIC conferences that preach turmoil and conflict, but, more importantly, it continues to provide training and logistical facilities to avowed terrorist groups. Some of the notorious groups that have received protection and training by the NIF regime in the Sudan include:

- The Tunisian Al-Nahda Party;

- The Libyan fundamentalist movement, including the Moslem Brotherhood and other fringe parties;

- The Egyptian Al-Jamia-Al Islamia (this group carried out the assassination attempt on President Mubarak with the full support of the NIF regime);

- Fundamentalist movements from the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

These and other terrorist groups have been receiving training in a constellation of permanent camps - Kassala, Ghedraf, Senar, Jebel Awliya - as well as at mobile training centres that the regime sets up periodically to circumvent detection.

The Sudan's flagrant interference in the affairs of its neighbours has evoked repeated protests in the United Nations and OAU.

You will recall the protest lodged against the Sudan by Uganda on 28 August 1995, in which it accused the Sudan of supplying weapons to subversive groups, as well as facilitating their infiltration into the northern and north-western parts of the country.

The indisputable evidence that the Federal Government of Ethiopia meticulously compiled firmly establishes the involvement of the NIF regime in the attempt against the life of President Mubarak during the OAU summit at Addis Ababa last year. This terrorist act was not only a violation of the sovereignty and hospitality of a neighbouring State but also an insult to Africa and OAU.

Allow me now to describe briefly Khartoum's acts of subversion against my country.

The NIF regime had started to interfere in Eritrean internal affairs as early as 1989. The NIF had hoped that the destitute situation in the refugee camps would provide it with fertile ground to recruit mercenaries to its sinister designs. Accordingly, it began to enlist, through various inducements, recruits to what it termed the "Eritrean Jihad Movement".

This act of unprovoked subversion and hostility continued to grow in spite of our repeated efforts to persuade the NIF to desist from its belligerent behaviour. To cite a few cases from the litany of such provocative conduct:

- Throughout 1992 and 1993 the NIF regime recruited, largely through coercion, hundreds of Eritreans from the refugee camps for military and security training at Al-Rahad and other camps near the city of Al-Ghedarf;

- It facilitated repeated incursions of these units across the border into Eritrea for subversive acts of landmine planting, and wanton attacks against civilian targets;

- The mercenary units often included Sudanese, Afghans, Moroccans, Tunisians and other extremists in their ranks;

- The NIF further launched its "Sudanization project" to coerce Eritrean refugees targeted for its sinister designs to accept Sudanese nationality;

- Sudanese security authorities resorted to extensive harassment and intimidation campaigns in the refugee camps to detain and interrogate those who resisted its wayward tactics.

The Government of Eritrea had exercised maximum restraint and patience, hoping against hope that it would succeed in weaning the Sudan away from the perilous path towards which it was heading so as to resume its rightful place in the region to promote solid cooperation and good neighbourliness. We dispatched high-level ministerial delegations to persuade the NIF to desist from its acts of interference and subversion. When efforts at bilateral arrangements failed to bear any fruit, we appealed to the United Nations through numerous letters and memorandums in the Security Council in 1994 and 1995. We welcomed informal mediation through the good offices of President Melles, and a trilateral meeting was held at Makelle, Ethiopia, between the three leaders in July 1994. All these endeavours were to no avail. Khartoum refused, stubbornly and consistently, to listen to reason and moderation. In the event, we could not tolerate any more infringements on our sovereignty, and had to sever our diplomatic ties with the Sudan in December 1994.

Khartoum's behaviour in the aftermath of the break in diplomatic relations was predictable. It simply went on to add more fuel to the fire and intensified its acts of hostility:

- In the first quarter of 1995, the NIF trained more terrorists at the Military College of Wadi Soidna, north of Omdurman city, and supplied them with assorted weapons;

- Khartoum deployed military contingents along the border with Eritrea with the express purpose of providing cover for infiltrating terrorist units.

The NIF regime is these days shedding crocodile tears over the violation of international law and good neighbourliness in accusing the Government of Eritrea of interfering in its internal affairs by supporting armed opposition movements. The truth of the matter is that the Government of Eritrea has not to date reciprocated, on a tit-for-tat basis, to counter the immeasurable acts of provocation and destabilization perpetrated by the NIF regime. The Government of Eritrea values deeply the profound historical, cultural and strategic bonds that bind together the two sisterly countries and peoples, and it is not prepared to allow the NIF to jeopardize these common interests.

I have not dealt with the deplorable domestic excesses of the NIF regime, especially its crimes of slavery and ethnic cleansing. These violations are an affront to deep-seated African values and they cannot be glossed over as "inevitable excesses of war" or as "interference in the country's domestic affairs". They constitute legitimate concerns for Africa and the countries of the region insofar as they affect and jeopardize regional and continental peace and inflict unacceptable injury on the dignity of the Sudanese people. The NIF must indeed be brought to task for its abhorrent practices of slavery and ethnic cleansing.

Insofar as its ambitions of external destabilization are concerned, it is clear from its incorrigible conduct that the NIF would have drawn the region in an endless web of turmoil and bloodshed. If it has not succeeded to bring this about, it is because it has neither the political constituency nor the military and financial capabilities to carry out its evil dreams, living as it does in a very precarious glass house. The potential danger that it poses must not, however, be underestimated.

[Original: Arabic]

Enclosure II

Confession by Captain Nasreddin Babikir Aba al-Khairat, a member of the General Security Services of the ruling National Islamic Front (NIF) regime in Khartoum, entrusted with the mission to assassinate President Isaias Afwerki

Question: What is your full name?

Answer: Nasreddin Babikir Aba al-Khairat Bosh.

Question: Your age?

Answer: 32 years.

Question: Your occupation?

Answer: Captain in the General Security Services.

Question: Your previous occupation?

Answer: Adjutant in the People's Armed Forces.

Question: Where were you born?

Answer: I was born in the Governorate of Zalinji in 1965.

Question: Could you give us a brief account of your education?

Answer: I was born and grew up in Zalinji and completed my primary and middle schooling there, continuing until the second year of the secondary level, when I left school. I then left Zalinji, my birthplace, for Khartoum; that was in 1981.

In 1982 I joined the Sudanese armed forces, to be exact the frontier forces in Khartoum, remaining and working in the capital until 1984, until I was transferred to the Upper Nile Governorate where I stayed until 1989. I worked in Malakal, Kober, Shikaw, Nasir, Bor and Ayot. In the Malakal countryside I was in the Gassera district. Then I went to western Sudan to Nyala, and stayed there until 1991. That was the year in which my uncle was assassinated. My family wanted me to take his place because he had been the support of the household. In accordance with the wishes of the family, I retired from the armed forces and was pensioned off in 1991.

Question: When you retired from the army, what was your military rank?

Answer: Adjutant; I was involved in support duties and I established a large military camp in the area for the peoples defence forces.

Question: Where?

Answer: In the area of Dahab Sharu. I started my activities in the camp and in July 1991 instructions came from the Governor, Abu Fatimah Abdullah, as well as from al-Tayyib Sikha and al-Tayyib Ibrahim Muhammad Khair, the commanders, and other administration officers in the area, and I was put in charge of two companies to carry out military operations in the Nuba Mountains, where our forces went early in July 1991. When we reached the area of Kadugli, we went to Taloshi where the rebels were. During our second day on the move I was wounded in the right cheek and was transferred to Khartoum for treatment where I was visited by members of my family, and by al-Tayyib Ibrahim Muhammad Khair, the Governor Abu Fatimah Abdullah and other members of the leadership.

Question: How long did you stay in hospital?

Answer: About eighteen days, after which I had three days' convalescence before I was summoned to the Security Service headquarters.

Question: Who was it that summoned you?

Answer: They came to me with my uncle, Amir al-Dalnaqawy Basisy, and we went to headquarters where al-Tayyib Ibrahim Muhammad Khair, Abdullah Abu Fatimah, Salah Bosh, Dr. Nafi Ali Nafi, and Dr. Ghazi Salah al-Din were present. All of them praised my activities in setting up the people's defence camp. My forces carried on their operations, and continued, together with the armed forces, to fight the rebels. They therefore thought it appropriate that I should be with them in the Security Service. They told me that, and I accepted their suggestion and went to the Inderaba camp, west of Omdurman.

Question: When was that?

Answer: It was on 10 August 1991 that I went to Inderaba and met the forces in training. I continued my training there and graduated on 1 January 1992.

Question: Who was at the Inderaba camp at that time? Were they all Sudanese or were there foreigners among them?

Answer: Our forces comprised 38 mujahidin, 18 of them were Sudanese and the other 20 were foreigners, including Egyptians, Algerians, Palestinians, Iranians and Eritreans.

Question: Will you tell us the names of some of the foreigners?

Answer: Among the Egyptians I remember Mustafa Hamza, who was one of those who carried out the attempted assassination of President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak in Adis Ababa, and Ali Mustafa and Tariq Mohamedein who came from King Faisal Street in Giza. Among the Palestinians, I remember Misira Suleiman, Islam Salamah and Hasan Arif. Among the Algerians I remember Mahsan Salih, Rabi' Hasan and Habib Rabih. The Chadeans included Muhammad Ali, Izz al-Din Husein, Adam Abd al-Hadi and Ahmad Shia. And the Iranians included Salah al-Din al-Husein and Abd al-Ilah (I do not recall his father's name). The Eritreans included Abd al-Salam who is now head of the Security Service of the Eritrean mujahidin.

Question: Do you remember the name of his father?

Answer: My goodness, he is a very, very good friend of mine. Once we arrived here at the village and visited their house in Qadarif close to the secondary school in the district called Karary. In addition to Abd al-Salam there was Bayyin who lives in Kassala and also Isma'il.

Question: The Sudanese who were with you, were all of them officers?

Answer: Yes, all of them were officers.

Question: Have you mentioned their names to us?

Answer: My intake consisted of Captain Mahir al-Tayyib Ahmed - who took part in that operation with me - Captain ... all of them are captains ... al-Tijari Omar, Omar Sa'd, Mu'awiya al-Baghid, Yasir Ja'far, Anwar Ishak, Abu al-Qasim Hasan, Khalid Abu Bakr, Yusef Husein, Wad al-Amda, Usama al-Turabi, Taha Muhammad Taha, Ahmad Adam Ahmad, al-Amin Yusef and al-Haj Iysa Sharif.

Question: Is Usama al-Turabi the son of Hasan al-Turabi?

Answer: Yes, he is the son of Sheikh Hassan al-Turabi but he was released during the torture resistance training.

Question: How long did the training last in the Inderaba camp?

Answer: The training lasted 6 months; when I arrived at the camp the initial training had already begun. When I turned up we started on the demanding stages of the training on withstanding interrogation.

Question: What classes did you have during the course before you started the training on withstanding interrogation?

Answer: We had lectures on security, courses on withstanding torture, religious seminars, and lectures on Muslims throughout the world.

Question: What preparation were you given to enable you to withstand interrogation?

Answer: There was intensive and tough military training to build you up and strengthen your powers of endurance, and then there were lectures on that subject. I remember that, on the last day, on a Friday, there was a programme on withstanding torture. We had our breakfast and then went to the mosque to pray and read the Koran. The whistle didn't sound to call us; midday came and nothing happened. And so it carried on. It was about 1 o'clock in the afternoon when a truck arrived full of soldiers who began to shout: "Treason, treason, conspiracy: you want to kill Sheikh Hassan al-Turabi". And they tied us up.

Question: Did they tie up just the Sudanese citizens or the whole group?

Answer: They tied up both the Sudanese and the others, and on the first day they subjected us to severe torture; on the second day, Usama al-Turabi was released.

Question: What kinds of torture did they subject you to?

Answer: They tied us up and buried us in the sand dunes that occur in that area. They made us go without water and food, even until the evening. And the torture continued in that way for eight whole days and then we were released after everybody's morale had been broken. After we had had a rest, we were given a lecture.

Question: Were you interrogated while you were under arrest?

Answer: They told us that there were subversive elements among us whose objective was to assassinate Sheikh Hassan al-Turabi and that they wanted to find out who was the organizer of the conspiracy, who was behind it, how agreement had been reached on the idea and how we managed to hold our meetings, even though we were together with them inside the camp. And they beat us up, and after the eighth day they told us that that was training in withstanding torture, and that it was not severe in comparison with what the Egyptian Islamists had suffered at the hands of the Egyptian Security Service; they had confessed and given the names of the leaders without justification. In the end Hosni Mubarak executed them in the Gabal al-Akhdar prison in Cairo: there were 400 of them. In fact they were innocent. The reason for what happened to them was that they made mistakes. That was why we concentrated on that aspect of the course, in order to avoid such mistakes.

Question: After the end of the course, did you graduate at Inderaba? Or if not where did your graduation take place?

Answer: We graduated at the Security Service office while the foreign Islamists graduated from the al-Aqsa Information Centre.

Question: What was your military rank when you graduated?

Answer: We were lieutenants in the People's Armed Forces, that is to say the army, of course.

Question: What work did you do in the Service after your graduation?

Answer: I worked in the Security Service office and in the Special Operations office.

Question: Who was in charge of the Security Service?

Answer: Colonel Salah Bosh.

Question: And who was in charge of Special Operations security?

Answer: Colonel Ahmad Mustafa. I worked in the External Security office under the command of Colonel Abubakr Sharaf al-Din Osman, and I also worked in the Prison Security Office.

Question: Where did you work mainly?

Answer: In the Security Service office. I later worked in the Special Operations office and was then transferred to External Security.

Question: What was the nature of your work in each of these branches?

Answer: The Security Service office is responsible for the safety and defence of Khartoum. I personally was working in the al-Haj Yusef area in district 3: Group on Suppression of Religious Apostasy.

Question: Tell us more about District 3: Group on Suppression of Religious Apostasy?

Answer: The unit was set up by the National Islamic Front in the al-Haj Yusef area in block 12, based at the home of Sheikh Babikir Yusef. He is one of the commanders of the camp whose job is to protect Khartoum. If, for example, there was any coup d'état attempted at night, the forces in the camps were available to deal with it. Obviously, the people working in the camps do not sleep at night; they patrol the streets in order to suppress any attempted coup at the outset.

Question: How many troops are in the anti-apostasy group?

Answer: They are currently a full brigade and its name has been changed from the Anti-Apostasy Group to the Anti-Apostasy Brigade.

Question: How are they deployed?

Answer: They are distributed throughout the al-Haj Yusef area; they have their own charcoal yards, transport vehicles, shops, etc.

Question: What kind of weapons do they have?

Answer: They have G-3s, Kalashnikovs, RPGs, and they have even got rocket launchers, and dumper trucks, big dumper trucks which they use for earth moving.

Question: What were your specific duties in those units?

Answer: I would come to the office at Sheikh Babikir Yusef's home every morning and evening to pick up reports. I would assess the situation and ask him about the situation and what he needed and then send a report to the Security Service office.

Question: What did those reports contain?

Answer: They described the situation in the area, stating whether the locality was secure, they detailed the movements of important people and any secret meetings that took place as well as any crowds that gathered in the streets. For example, if we got information to the effect that certain people were entering a particular person's house, we would immediately make a raid on the house.

Question: How did you carry out such a mission?

Answer: I would send the reports to the Security Service office which would pass them on to the Special Operations Service which would carry out a raid and do the subsequent interrogations. There are fax machines in Khartoum and, however hard we tried, we could not find them. Very, very bad situations occurred. We would go and take people from their homes, sometimes just wrapped in a bedsheet. The raid would be at one or two o'clock in the morning. I carried out a raid in the al-Bahr district on an agricultural engineer called Abdulmun'im Muhammad Abdulrahman. He was a member of the Ba'th party and was suspected of having a fax machine. We searched the house until morning but found nothing. We finally left him a summons and went out. That wasn't the first or the last time when that happened. We would sometimes pick up retired generals who had left the army, and take them with us, and release them in the morning. On occasion, we would keep them for seven or eight days.

Question: Did you arrest them on the basis of information, or were the raids just made at random?

Answer: On the basis of information, but the information was sometimes incorrect. On one occasion I remember raiding the home of Mahdi Babu Namir, who was extremely provoked. All the retired generals had to report daily to confirm their presence. Hoteliers also brought in lists of the names of people who stayed at their hotels.

Question: After working in that Service, where were you transferred to?

Answer: I went to the External Security Service, and was then given a mission to carry out in Chad in 1994.

Question: Tell us about your mission in Chad.

Answer: The Service had received information indicating that there were members of the opposition in the territory of Chad and that they had opened offices, and also that there had been an incursion of southerners there. This created some anxiety within the Service that there might be a new military front in west Sudan. I decided to enter Chad posing as a merchant. I had 6 million Sudanese pounds with which I bought 200 sacks of dates. I had a letter addressed to the customs in Geneina exempting me from customs dues. That is how I entered Chad.

Question: Who accompanied you on your trip to Chad?

Answer: Corporal Sami al-Amin whom I had left in Abbesha with one of my relatives, a merchant named Isma'il. I continued on my way until I got to N'Djamena and the Sudanese market there. I collected information all of which confirmed that there were no opposition members in the capital of Chad. There were only some refugees from the south who had come to Chad from Kenya, Uganda and Zaire as a result of changes that had occurred in those countries. The refugees were engaged in trading and brokering and had nothing to do with politics. After that I came back from N'Djamena to Khartoum.

Question: Did you submit your report to the Security Service?

Answer: Yes, I told them that there was no sign of the opposition in N'Djamena and they believed me.

Question: What was the next mission with which you were entrusted?

Answer: After a period of leave I was sent on mission to the Central African Republic, specifically to the Awir road, to cover the visit of General Omar al-Bashir.

Question: What were the reasons behind their choice of you for that mission?

Answer: I had previously been to Chad on 15 November 1995 to Darbat Atri. We had received information from Atri that incidents had occurred in November 1995 in the Mornia hills and Jebal Jubun. In the first incident a mobile unit from the central reserve forces had clashed with an unidentified group, as a result of which the police lost 21 men. So No. 494 battalion was dispatched to that area and in the fighting that took place the government forces lost 18 men. The government troops reported that they had inflicted heavy losses on the unidentified units, but not a single body was found. In addition, information reaching us from Geneina indicated that the opposition forces had reached Atri with forged dollars, the purpose of which was to sabotage the economy of the area, and that they had also opened offices there.

There was in fact a great deal of truth in the report from Geneina. I remember that I was the duty officer and was relieved in the morning. I went home and received a telephone call saying that the opposition forces, and their leadership in particular, were stationed in Atri. I was instructed to lead a contingent to that place consisting of a company of specially trained mujahidin. The company was transported by air to Geneina on board a Hercules aircraft. I reached Same and went to Jiddo, and on 17 November I went on to Geneina, to the operations room headed by General Muhammad Yasin, Brigadier Hadi al-Wasila, the commander of No. 22 brigade Ibrahim Hasan Jalar, and General Hasan Salih who was in charge of Positive Security. They gave me a detailed briefing on the current situation.

Question: What information did you get from them?

Answer: We learned that the opposition had reached Atri and that its leaders were stationed there. The mission entrusted to me was to enter Atri. I was informed that the opposition forces were outside Atri but that the leaders were in the town itself. We were asked to invade the headquarters of the leadership in Atri. We were told that the people there were drunk and that all we had to do was to carry out the operation. That was on a Sunday, which was therefore a weekend holiday, and the people really were drunk. We drove in cars from Geneina until we had covered half the distance, then we continued our advance on foot. We crossed the river and reached Atri from the rear and attacked the camp at 4 o'clock in the morning. The resistance was very weak and between 4 and 10.30 in the morning we took command of the camp, cutting off their regular communications and seizing all documents which were to be taken to Khartoum in accordance with instructions I had been given. They were all written in French. It took us a long time to disconnect their powerful radio equipment, and that caused some delay. Just as we were leaving the area, a platoon of Chadian mujahidin, who were the opposition in Chad, arrived. They had been instructed to join us in the attack on the camp, but they arrived too late.

Question: Were the Chadian mujahidin the opposition to the regime of Idriss Deby?

Answer: Yes. Their camp was at Ansero. We left the Chadian opposition forces and returned to our positions. I received a material reward.

Question: How much was the reward?

Answer: Five million Sudanese pounds. The troops got a million and a half. Luckily for them they were all dispersed to various embassies except for Sami who worked on recruiting elements for the Eritrean Jihad in Medani, and that earned him real money. When the troops who had been with me were dispersed after receiving their rewards, I continued with my work.

Question: In which section of the Service did you carry on working?

Answer: In External Security. I went to prepare the plan for General Omar al-Bashir's visit to Bangui in February to meet the President of the Central African Republic, Ange-Félix Patasse. I carried out that mission disguised as a merchant and travelled in a truck loaded with sacks exempt from customs dues.

Question: How many days did you spend in the Central African Republic?

Answer: I went there on 5 Ramadan and returned to Sudan on the second or third day of the next month.

Question: Did you visit Bangui disguised as a merchant?

Answer: Yes.

Question: After your return from Bangui did you continue to work in the External Security Service or were you transferred to another service?

Answer: I was transferred to the head office of the Special Operations Service. I was attached to the board that was interrogating the elements who had carried out an attempted coup d'état on 5 March under Colonel Awwad al-Karim al-Nagar. When the interrogations were over they were brought to trial.

Question: How many people were under arrest?

Answer: Those detained in connection with the coup organized by Colonel Awwad al-Karim al-Nagar were two brothers who were retired officers, Munir and Samir Abbaro, Major General Babikir Khalifa al-Jali, Colonel Muhammad Osman, Usama Gandi from the radio and television service, Asad Taj al-Sir and Mubarak al-Mahdi.

Question: Mubarak al-Mahdi? Which one?

Answer: He was just somebody called Mubarak al-Mahdi. There were also retired army people one of whom was called Isam, and another who was called Hasan or Husein Bershem. Overall in Kober prison there were about 12 or 13 prisoners from the Khartoum coup d'état. The same board was also responsible for investigating the attempted coup on 7 August in Port Sudan. On the 8th of that month there was a session to deal with Awwad al-Karim's people in which I participated. But I was given the task of bringing in the elements who had carried out the attempted coup in Port Sudan.

Question: How many of them were there?

Answer: I may be able to remember their names: retired Colonel Abde al-Ma'ruf Husein, retired Colonel Omar Muhammad Osman Kejer and retired Colonel Fadl al-Said Abdullah. There was a businessman, Ibrahim Diyab, and Adil Ali Dehab, Abdul Mun'im Muhammad Yusef (an

official at Port Sudan airport), Khedir Muhammad Khedir (who was working for a firm), and a retired customs officer, Salim Breima. Those were the eight people whom I took to Khartoum. As for the others, the accusation against them was unproved.

Question: Did you participate in the investigations?

Answer: Yes, I did.

Question: Who was in charge of the investigations?

Answer: Yasir Ja'fer and Ma'awiya al-Baghid. They took charge of the interrogations and the use of torture.

Question: What sort of torture was used?

Answer: The methods used were beating, physical suspension and sleep deprivation by tying the detainees to the window bars so that they couldn't even go to sleep. We untied them only for prayers and at mealtimes. In that way confessions were obtained from them.

Question: You mentioned that you had taken a course in terrorism. When was that?

Answer: In 1994 after my return from Chad.

Question: How long did the course last?

Answer: The course lasted only three months.

Question: Did the course take place inside the Service or outside it?

Answer: It took place inside the Service, but we used to go out for training in marksmanship either during the day or at night.

Question: Who was in charge of the course?

Answer: Sheikh al-Hussein who was director of operations at the Economics and Information Centre (Hamas, Khartoum). In fact I found out that Sheikh al-Hussein was really none other than "Carlos". I discovered that after he was arrested at the end of 1994 or the beginning of 1995. I remember that I went to the head office of Special Operations and found Sheikh al-Hussein and confirmed that he was in fact Carlos.

Question: Did he give the lectures on your course under the name of Sheikh al-Hussein?

Answer: Everybody knew him by the name Sheikh al-Hussein. One day, when I arrived, I found that the officers were forbidden to enter, which was unusual because we officers had the privilege of entering without question because we were disciplined. When I reached the special

operations office on my way to the toilets, I found the office toilet to be out of order and undergoing maintenance with a sign saying that it was out of use. I was obliged to go past the cells. There were two of them: one was unoccupied and in the other there was a person. This person who I saw was Sheikh al-Hussein. I greeted him and when he saw me he tried to cover his head with a towel. I asked him, "What happened? Are you all right?" He replied "It's nothing at all." On my way back from the toilets I found Ahmad al-Mustafa who shouted in my face: "What are you doing, and what business have you got coming here?" I told him that I had come to go to the toilet. He then asked me what I had seen, and I told him that I hadn't seen anything. So I asked him what was going on, and he replied "Go away. It's no business of yours". I was sure that the person was Carlos, and since that day Sheikh al-Hussein was not seen any more.

Question: What things did you learn on the terrorism course?

Answer: First of all they gave us a definition of terrorism in a seminar. Then they explained that terrorism was used against regimes either to exert pressure on them or to make them fulfil certain conditions or demands. Terrorism has been used for a very long time. For example, the Red Indians used it against the Americans and the Irish against the British. Islamists had also used it, and it had proved successful because the Islamists had remained true to the verse in the Koran in the Surat al-Anfal (The Spoils): "Make ready for them whatever force you can, to terrify thereby the enemy of God and your enemy, and others besides them that you know not; God knows them. ... He is the All-hearing, the All-knowing." On that basis, Islamists had been successful in the use of terrorism as shown by actions of Palestinians, Iranians and Egyptians. That was because their true religion called on them to do so. We were given various lectures on terrorism and its variants which are explosives, assassination, kidnapping and vehicle accidents. We specialized in these four variants. Then we came to the final project.

Question: How many officers took this course along with you?

Answer: There were 12 Sudanese.

Question: Do you remember their names?

Answer: I remember all of them.

Question: Who were they?

Answer: Mahir al-Tayyib Ahmad, Anwar Ishak, Khalid Abbaker, Yusef Husain, Yasir Ja'far, Ma'awiya al Baghid, Abu al-Qasim Hasan, al-Tijani Omar, Omar Sa'd and Wud al-Umda.

Question: What was their military rank?

Answer: They were all in my intake, and they were all captains like me.

Question: You said that, after the end of the course, there was a final project. What kind of project was it?

Answer: The project was a kind of test to assess our standard, as a basis for the award of certificates. Everyone had to plan an operation based on what we had been taught about terrorism. Every individual had to depend on his personal skill, and decided what he would do. Some of them went for Sheikh Hassan al-Turabi himself. I decided to go for General Omar Hasan al-Bashir.

Question: What do you mean by go for General Bashir?

Answer: To work out an imaginary assassination plan targeting General Omar al-Bashir as a final operation.

Question: Were you asked to devise a project to assassinate an important person?

Answer: Yes, but the target was not specified; it was I who chose General al-Bashir.

Question: So you were left free to choose?

Answer: Yes.

Question: So, will you explain to us the steps you would have taken to assassinate General Omar al-Bashir on the basis of what you had studied on the course.

Answer: After we had been given the lecture about the final project, we split up and we were given some cash. Everything we wanted was provided to enable us to achieve the desired objective. I chose General al-Bashir because he was the easiest target for me because of my job at the Security Service head office and because I knew the pattern and timing of his movements. The question I had to answer was: from where can I get a shot at him? My choice fell on the Arab Investment Company because it was opposite the headquarters of the General Staff. It was a building of four storeys, and I went to it. By means of someone called Taj al-Sir al-Hadi, who was a friend of mine, I posed as a businessman. Several times I had been in the cafeteria at breakfast time, and I invited him to have breakfast with me. With his help, I managed to slip up to the top floor of the building ... in other words the 4th floor. It was a suitable place as it provided a view of the residence of President al-Bashir which was directly below me. I found that the distance was only 925 metres.

Question: How did you work out the range?

Answer: It was just an estimate. After that I took my plan and met Colonel Abubakr Sharaf al-Din and told him that I had finished my project. I told him I needed 20,000 Sudanese pounds, a foldable G-3 rifle and a telescope. I went to the Treasury and drew the money. I then went

to the head office and took a telescope and finalized all the other preparations. On the following day, which was the final day, I told them I was ready and wanted the monitors. A captain who had been with me in the Service was appointed, together with another person from the Positive Security Service, a major called Adil Hamad al-Nil. We went together to the building and I handed them the telescope.

Question: Was that the company's building?

Answer: Yes, the Arab Investment Company. We were there from 7.55 onwards and at 8.35 the President came out. He always goes out at some time like 8.25, 8.30 or 8.35. So President al-Bashir came out at 8.35 with his cane under his arm and walked towards his car. His driver came forward to open the door and saluted. I then focused the lens of the telescope and told them that this was the target. They asked me whether it was al-Bashir, and I said it was and they said, "Well done". Then they made their report to the office. At 3 o'clock, Carlos took it upon himself to come in person to supervise the project. At 2.30 we went back to the building. Members of the Security Service had already informed them that we had a job to do. We waited until 3 o'clock, and after 3 o'clock General al-Bashir was walking towards his residence, at which time Carlos was on the 4th floor of the building.

Question: So it was you who specified the times when General al-Bashir would go out and return?

Answer: Yes, I specified both times. In fact Sheikh al-Hussein (Carlos) looked at it and considered the General to be theoretically dead. Sheikh al-Hussein himself met him and told him that he had been about to die. Thus I got an A certificate, in other words I was first in my intake. They gave me a house near the People's Pharmacy and a sum of 200,000 Sudanese pounds.

Question: Was the house given to you as a reward for your successful final project?

Answer: It was in recognition of my being accepted as a new cadre of the Front. So I became cadre No. 169.

Question: What do you mean by cadre No. 169?

Answer: Within the organization it means that I am officer No. 169 of the National Islamic Front. Whether in the Army, in the Police Force or in the Prison Service I am No. 169.

Question: So that means that your seniority in the Front is number 169?

Answer: Yes, in the Front. The other lectures and seminars given to us were concerned with how, if there were a coup - God forbid - we should respond to it as a reverse for the governing regime.

Question: Where did you go after completing the course on terrorism?

Answer: I was at the headquarters of the Security Service, in External Security. We went on patrol, covered official visits and carried out routine missions.

Question: Which other service did you work in?

Answer: I worked in the Prison Service; that was in 1996.

Question: What precisely did you do in the Prison Service?

Answer: I was transferred there at my own request. Then, in accordance with instructions, I was given another mission which was to go to Eritrea. I was a bit perturbed about that because I didn't know anything about Eritrea, though I started to collect information by making inquiries.

Question: Where did your instructions come from?

Answer: From the Director of the Service, Muhammad Ahmad al-Hadi. I was put in charge of Prison Security.

Question: Tell us exactly what your duties were at the head office of Prison Security?

Answer: First I separated the administration of political prisoners from the prison administration and then I started on the maintenance of the sanitary facilities of the prison.

Question: Where was this?

Answer: In Kober prison.

Question: And after that?

Answer: I collected information on the prisoners, including al-Hadi Bushra, First Lieutenant al-Sadiq Abd al-Fatah, Luqman al-Badawi Muhammad, al-Fonsi Matata and Muhammad Yahya. I got information from them and then copied it and distributed it to the rest of the group.

Question: Who provided you with the information?

Answer: I got the information from reading reports and from making inquiries. The heads of the Security Service were all complying with my requests.

Question: Were you entrusted with your mission to Eritrea while you were at the head office of Prison Security?

Answer: Yes.

Question: So it was from that time onwards that you started to collect information?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Who passed on the information to you?

Answer: The head office of the Security Service. Since there were a large number of documents, I chose some of them, copied them and distributed them to the group.

Question: Who was in the group?

Answer: The team of infiltrators who came with me; there were 34 of them.

Question: What was the information you received from Luqman?

Answer: Luqman told me that he had been in Saudi Arabia and was forcibly repatriated from there to the Sudan. He once tried to return to Saudi Arabia because he had left some goods of his there. When his attempt to go to Saudi Arabia from the Sudan failed, he went to Eritrea where he was recruited by opposition groups and he joined their ranks. He was trained in Sawa camp and later worked in surveillance. He took advantage of the fact that he was on a reconnaissance mission and deserted.

Question: Did you interrogate him?

Answer: Yes I did.

Question: Was that inside the prison or outside it?

Answer: Luqman al-Badawi surrendered to the people of Abu Jemel and al-Sadis and was then transferred to Kassala and then to Fao. From there he was taken to the Positive Security Service where he was able to contact a sergeant and handed him a message to his uncle, Muhammad Osman, the Director of Beliya.

Question: The Director of the Beliya office?

Answer: Yes, the Director of the Beliya office. He has the rank of colonel. His uncle came and got him released without transferring him to us. I got a copy of the report of his interrogation in Kassala. We asked the Kassala people who said they had handed him over to the army people. We asked the army and they said they had transferred him to Positive Security and Positive Security, in their turn, told us that he had been released. Because I had his address I ordered his arrest. So he was arrested again at his home in Jebel Awliya.

Question: What information did you get from Luqman about the Alliance?

Answer: First, I asked him about the leadership of the Alliance Forces, about their weaponry, their support, their training, their ready cash and their miscellaneous supplies. Luqman told me about all these things. The only thing I did not believe was his statement that all officers, as soon as they join the Alliance Forces, or when they frequent the Alliance over a long period, are transferred to Asmera.

Question: What did you learn about the Alliance Force's sources of weapons and funding?

Answer: He said it all came from the centre, where the general staff is. He said that the roof of the centre is visible from the camp.

Question: What else?

Answer: He didn't say anything else. He said that foreign journalists came to the place and visited them several times.

Question: What about First Lieutenant al-Sadiq Abd al-Fatah? Did you interrogate him yourself, or find interrogation reports on him?

Answer: I found the information, but I did meet him. We recruited him to the Security Service and I sat down and talked to him a great deal. Al-Sadiq is a member of the Alliance, specifically he is in the Legitimate Command and he had been in Kenya. It was just that there was a disagreement between him and the group and he returned to Cairo where his mother visited him. He had family problems. His mother made efforts to get him to return to the Sudan and she took him to Khartoum. I was one of the people who met him at Khartoum airport.

Question: Did you interrogate al-Hadi Bushra or did you get a report on him?

Answer: I did not meet him but I received a copy of the report that had been prepared on him.

Question: Who gave you the report?

Answer: The head office of the Security Service. It was Salah Bosh who interrogated him at the headquarters of the Investigation Board, and I got the report. Al-Hadi Bushra said that he was one of the founders of the Legitimate Command which had abandoned its objectives and guiding principles. He was against armed struggle among citizens of one country. Then a sharp disagreement broke out between him and Mubarak al-Fadil and with so-called General Kaffadah Sa'id (Abdulrahman). That was one of the reasons that made him return to Khartoum.

Question: What was the next step you took after you got to know about these files?

Answer: I used to make 35 copies of each report in order to give a copy to each of the 34 members of the group. Some of its members used to

undertake missions inside Eritrea. Lectures were given assessing the situation in Eritrea and Ethiopia. Then we divided the spending money, and they were given three days' leave.

Question: Who selected the group of 34?

Answer: I found it already in existence. Even during the time when I was in the Service I wasn't aware of their existence, apart from Fadil al-Tujani who worked as our driver.

Question: Do you remember the names of some of its members?

Answer: I remember Staff Sergeant Muhammad Salih, Mun'im, Muhammed Jamal al-Din, Adam Harun, Mujandal, Muhammad Ali and Akasha al-Tayyib.

Question: What were the duties of these individuals?

Answer: To infiltrate the Alliance and collect information about it. They were assigned to infiltrate through three fronts: Kurmuk, Qalabat and Kassala. We left Khartoum on Thursday, 14 November 1996, and arrived at Medani (Siniyyat wad al-Majdoub). Then two cars crossed the bridge carrying the Kurmuk group and the Qalabat group. We made straight for down-town Medani and proceeded to the office of the Eritrean Jihad in Marinjan to pick up Sami al-Amin.

Question: Sami al-Amin was with you on the mission, was he?

Answer: Yes, I took him with me. He was detailed to go on the same day.

Question: Who was it that gave the order for you to enter Eritrea?

Answer: The head office of the Security Service took the decision but I have no way of knowing the name of the person who gave the instructions. As for me, I received instructions from Muhammad Ahmad al-Adabi.

Question: What was the nature of the instructions?

Answer: Before I took over as head of the Prison Service, I was told that I had a mission and that I would be going to Eritrea. I asked why I should be going to Eritrea when I had just returned from the Central African Republic, and had been twice to Chad. I said there were many other people in the Service. I was told, "No. Go away now and you leave tomorrow morning." So I said, "All right." At that time I was at the head office of the Security Service with Mahir al-Tayyib. I telephoned Mahir al-Tayyib and he asked me to come and see him. When I got there, I received the instructions to go to Eritrea with a group of 34 people (35 in all, including me). Our mission would be to infiltrate the opposition forces, and my duty was to apply the science I had learned. So I said, "All right, no problem."

Question: Tell us what was meant by the expression "the science you had learnt".

Answer: It meant terrorism. After that they explained that my mission was to liquidate Afwerki. So I said: "Okay, God willing, it shall be done."

Question: Why did they tell you to join the Alliance Forces?

Answer: That was based on my own wishes.

Question: On the basis of the information that you had collected, why did you choose to go to the Alliance Forces?

Answer: I chose to go to the Alliance Forces on the basis of the information I had obtained from Luqman Badawi Muhammad to the effect that President Isaias Afwerki was close to the Alliance Forces. He had told me that Isaias Afwerki was constantly visiting the headquarters of the Alliance Forces in Asmera. That was why I chose to join the Alliance Forces.

Question: What did you intend to achieve through the Alliance Forces?

Answer: I wanted to carry out the liquidation of President Isaias Afwerki under cover of the Alliance Forces and the opposition.

Question: While you were at the Security Service were you shown photographs, and do you know Colonel Abd al-Aziz?

Answer: Yes, I know him.

Question: How do you know him?

Answer: There are pictures of him. Pictures taken when he was a colonel in the air force, and a photograph of him when he was a lieutenant. There is also a list of the Alliance Forces which includes a photograph of Abd al-Aziz Khalid.

Question: What information do you have on Abd al-Aziz Khalid? Was there a particular person who gave you information on him?

Answer: Abubakr Sharaf al-Din Osman told me; he talked a lot about him and about his group, and about his work in the eastern region, as well as here in Khartoum. He told me about some of the areas of his work and his biography. I don't remember it in detail but, in any case, before he told me about Abd al-Aziz Khalid I would have known him anywhere. As soon as I went to Sawa I saw him and he was wearing clothes that were out of keeping with the dignity of Abd al-Aziz Khalid who was said to be causing such a stir in the country. He was practically unrecognizable, but I recognized him. I went to al-Tarbi. I returned on the next day and Ali Yasin asked me

to come over and told me the leader wanted to see me. So I went to him, met him and saluted him.

Question: Who went with you to Kassala?

Answer: One group had already arrived before us in Kassala. We arrived at about 1 o'clock in the morning. It could have been 2 o'clock or 1.30, I don't know exactly. We went to the Kassala hotel. Mahir al-Tayyib Ahmad from the operations staff was with me.

Question: What was his military rank?

Answer: He was a captain from my intake. Mahir al-Tayyib Ahmad and Sami al-Amin.

Question: Why did you bring Sami al-Amin with you?

Answer: I was the one who recruited Sami al-Amin. He is very close to me and I am like an elder brother or an uncle to him. He respects me a great deal. The reason why I brought him with me was that I had received information from the leadership of the Security Service that the housing people would give us 400 housing plots and it was said that they would be distributed on the basis of seniority to those with a rank of staff sergeant and above. So Sami would not be eligible. So I thought that, if I brought him with me, he might later be promoted to sergeant and would be eligible for a plot of land. That was the reason. In addition to that, Sami is a great help to me and does my laundry and ironing.

Question: Did he know about the mission?

Answer: No, he didn't. Sami knew nothing. He asked me in Kassala "What is the mission?" and I said to him "Don't ask me." He found me in Sawa and gave me what Chadians call a laissez-passer. I asked what it was and tore up the document saying "What's the use of such documents?" He asked about the mission and I said to him "Don't talk. There is no mission."

Question: When you were preparing the force in Khartoum how were you financed? What sum did they pay you?

Answer: I paid 250 dollars and 750,000 Sudanese pounds for each man.

Question: In other words, for 34 men?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Who brought the money?

Answer: I drew it from the Treasury.

Question: Did you draw it yourself?

Answer: Yes, I did.

Question: As far as you were concerned, what sum was earmarked for this operation?

Answer: Seven million Sudanese pounds and 1,000 dollars.

Question: That was for the operation?

Answer: Yes, for the operation to assassinate Isaias Afwerki.

Question: Were there officers in the team that entered Kassala?

Answer: There were no officers. The team was led by Staff Sergeant Muhammad Salih.

Question: Were there officers in the operation? Were you the only officer?

Answer: I was the only officer in the entire mission.

Question: Why is it that none of the other officers who took the course with you participated?

Answer: To tell the truth, I went to the Service and said, "I am the only one coming and going. Aren't there any others? Why don't any others go on mission? The only ones going on mission are Mahir and myself". Mahir had gone, and so did I.

Question: Where did Mahir go?

Answer: Mahir had gone to Ethiopia, to Gondar, but after that he was moved elsewhere. That is what was said in the newspapers Alwan, Al-Sudan al-Hadith and Al-Inqadh.

Question: What did they say?

Answer: They published an interview with him.

Question: What did you do after you arrived in Kassala?

Answer: After arriving in Kassala I spent the night in the hotel. And in the middle of the night I went down with Sami and told Mahir: "Take this car and go." He said "No I won't." I said, "No, go to the Security Service." So he went. He came back in the morning and started to collect information for me about the Kassala office and the situation in Kassala. I told him that I wanted to go to the Security Service and he said, "No, don't go there. There are a large number of people at the Security Service wanting passes to enter Eritrea. Just forget about going to the Security Service. Stay here at the hotel and I'll do it all for you." So I said, "All right, no problem." So he went there and came back. And he started going back and forth to the hotel to provide me with information. He told me there were three

people for whom he could get passes to enter Eritrea by pretending to be merchants in the Sudan, and claiming that there were people in business with them who had defrauded them and that they wanted to enter Eritrea to go after them and get their money back. As for the other members of the group, he said we would simply take them along with us and that there was no problem about passes. He said, "You have already completely dissociated yourself from them." However, Sami was with me in the hotel and he asked me about the mission. I said to him "Sami, don't ask me again about the mission". Mahir was able to collect all the information for me and went off to join the group. So I gave up my responsibility for the group. So the rest of the group, under Staff Sergeant Muhammad Salih, joined me in the Hikimdar Hotel. And Sami was with me in the hotel and again asked about the mission. I told him not to ask. So he said "Why shouldn't I ask? I want to see my family and I don't want to live in this hotel." So I told him he could go to his family, but should report to me every morning and evening, which is what he did. While he was collecting information, Mahir used to come to me at night and we would go to the Police Officers' Club to discuss various subjects. He assured me that it was quite impossible for me to enter Eritrea and that I would be arrested at the frontier. First of all I had to leave the money behind, and secondly I had to leave behind my luggage and all my clothes. I told him I would do so. That was on the evening of the 16th at the Kassala Police Officers' Club. On the morning of the 17th we were in the hotel and Mahir came, followed by Sami, and I told Sami to take the luggage and the money to my uncle Abu Bakr Adam Abdullah, a General in charge of the Port Sudan Customs. Then Mahir told me about a situation involving his wife, saying that he needed money, and I gave him 500,000 Sudanese pounds, and gave six million Sudanese pounds and 1,000 dollars to Sami and he went off with the money. The same day I hired a car and drove it as far as the office of the Alliance Forces in Tessenai.

Question: Whose car did you use to enter Eritrea?

Answer: It belonged to one of the citizens, but I don't know his name. I got to know him on my own and through Mahir. If you saw Mahir, you would think he was someone from Halfa, or eastern Sudan. We asked the owner of the hotel, saying that we were businessmen and that someone had stolen some money of ours and that we had information that the man had gone to Tessenai. We wanted to go there and needed a car to take us. And he said, "Do you want to get it by legal means, or as a private deal?" We said, "as a private deal." So he started to look for a car. At that time the Sikafa sporting tournament was just beginning and the hotelier said that the people were afraid because the area was under tight security and there was no way to get a car. I asked him to try because I wanted to leave straight away. Then, on the 17th, early in the morning, he brought me a man who would take me. And he took me to the Alliance Forces. Half way there, we came upon troops who fired at us. As a result, Mahir ran away, and we both entered Eritrea. When we got there, the authorities were convinced that we had no political affiliations. Before I arrived,

Mahir was certain that I had been captured. And I was certain that he thought that I was the one who had got into trouble.

Question: Which way did you enter?

Answer: We took the Kassala-Abu-Jamal-Tessenai route.

Question: Where did you go after Tessenai?

Answer: I went to the offices of the Alliance Forces and met some of their members in Tessenai. I stayed there with them and talked about the Alliance Forces, but I didn't pay great attention to what they said because I had already heard it from here and there. Moreover, that was not what I was concerned with. After three days, Ali Yasin came to me and said, "Let's go to the camp." So we went together to Sawa.

Question: Whom did you meet when you arrived at Sawa?

Answer: I found them to be people who had a cause, people who were really enthusiastic fighters together with others who had left the country in mysterious circumstances, leaving families behind in the Sudan. When I saw these people in Sawa I saw how difficult their life was and I wondered why they should come to these barren and rugged mountains and have to eat such poor food as "shiro" and "hunay" and other stuff. I was thus able to appreciate and understand the Alliance and I remember that one day I took a piece of paper and wrote: "They are some of the sincerest and noblest people of the Sudan".

Question: How did you begin to put your plan into operation?

Answer: I was very anxious when I arrived at Sawa; I was expecting a firm signal to go to Asmera.

Question: What kind of signal?

Answer: A signal from the Alliance Forces, giving me a mission to go to Asmera. This was on the basis of what Luqman al-Badawi had said. I was expecting at any moment to be getting into a vehicle heading for Asmera. But this did not happen. Time dragged on and I became very anxious. So I began to pretend I had pains in my spine as a result of being wounded by a mine. I hoped they would send me to Asmera to have my back treated so that I could accomplish my mission.

Question: You mentioned earlier that, when you were in Khartoum, the Alliance Forces showed you photographs of Abd al-Aziz Khalid. What information did you have about the Alliance Forces?

Answer: The information I had was that the Alliance Forces were our target and the only cancer in the Eastern region; that they were causing a lot of trouble and that their last attack had been the attack at Abu Qamal. From the information I collected other than through my

group, I learned that there was another team that would come to eliminate Abd al-Aziz Khalid. His picture was available at the Security Service. So a team would be formed and, God willing, he would be eliminated from the Alliance.

Question: Was this another mission?

Answer: Yes, this was another mission; other people will come.

Question: Do you know the names of the people who will come?

Answer: I don't know them yet.

Question: If your mission to Asmera had succeeded on the basis of the information given to you by Luqman to the effect that officers had freedom of movement between Sawa and Asmera, and if you had managed to reach Asmera, what would have been your plan for assassinating President Isaias Afwerki?

Answer: I would have started by following the movements of the President, observing his surroundings, finding out about his timetable, his appointments and his movements, and his scheduled meetings. For example, meetings with ministers are announced day by day throughout the week. Those were the kind of things I would observe. I already knew that there would be two problems: it would not be possible to eliminate him on his way to or from his office or home. He could only be assassinated when getting out of a car and going into his home, or getting out of a car on his way to the office, or getting out of his car and advancing to a podium to give a public speech, or while giving a seminar or while walking in the open. He could not be targeted while he was in a car.

Question: Why?

Answer: Because the modern cars of Heads of State are all armour-plated. If you take up a position on the road and fire and hit the glass, it's no good because the car is bullet-proof.

Question: How were you planning to kill him?

Answer: I had many plans. I had studied the Alliance Forces in great detail because Luqman al-Badawi had told me that Isaias Afwerki was a close friend of Abd al-Aziz Khalid, the commander of the Alliance Forces, and often went to his home. I often disputed that statement, but he repeatedly confirmed it and I became entirely convinced it was true. At 8 o'clock in the evening we went out in a car and after driving around for a while we had dinner out and then came back and put beds on the roof and continued our conversation about the President being the friend of Abd al-Aziz Khalid.

Question: During the course you took on terrorism, did you study anything specific for this particular operation?

Answer: Yes. On the terrorism course we studied collective assassination and individual assassination. Individual assassination is the easiest form. You can carry out the operation in the middle of a crowd and then get rid of your weapon. You may get arrested with a lot of other people who are rounded up on suspicion and you may be tortured with them, but in such a case you can pretend to be a mute; they may torture you for a bit, but then they will let you go. If the operation is not carried out and the plan is not sound and fails there may be no solution other than to kill yourself in order to save your organization and those who sent you from international condemnation.

Question: Why was individual assassination chosen in the case of President Afwerki?

Answer: Because people have learned from experience. I discussed this with Ghazi Salah al-Din who said that we must not make the same mistake as we made in the case of the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa. He said that full precautions had already been taken in Asmera and there were no Islamic organizations there. It was clear of such organizations. Asmera was free from any tendency with which we could claim to have relations. He said that he did not want to comment on the appropriateness of individual assassination because I had been given training on the science of terrorism, and he had not.

Question: Where did you have this conversation with Ghazi Salah al-Din, and where did you meet him?

Answer: At the Service. Ghazi Salah al-Din was constantly coming to the headquarters of the Service.

Question: But where?

Answer: At the headquarters of the Security Service. In the office of al-Dabi.

Question: Was your discussion in the presence of al-Dabi?

Answer: Yes: the people present were al-Dabi, Ghazi Salah al-Din and Ibrahim Shams al-Din.

Question: Did they give you any detailed explanation about the operation?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Why did they decide that it should be carried out as an individual operation?

Answer: It was decided tl .t the operation should be carried out by a single person because it would not be possible for a group to infiltrate. Their own studies had indicated that it would be possible for the operation to be executed by smuggling in three or four people. But

it turned out that such a group could not get into Eritrea or Ethiopia. So they insisted that it should be done by one person, and I was selected as the one who would execute the mission.

Question: What was the time limit set by the Security Service for you to execute the mission?

Answer: Our instructions were to execute the mission and return by the end of April 1997. If we did not show up by 10 May 1997, we would be regarded as missing.

Question: So the specified deadline was the end of April?

Answer: The end of April was the time for our return, or a few days after that, up to 10 May 1997, after which we would be assumed to be missing.

Question: You said in previous statements that you were given 7 million Sudanese pounds and 1,000 dollars for the execution of the mission and you also said that you gave your uncle the money which you had received to finance the operation. So you had no money. How were you thinking of financing the operation?

Answer: It is true that I sent the money back from Kassala to Port Sudan and I expected it to be sent to me in Niyala so that I could build my own house. As for the money in Eritrea, I could get it because I have cadres in Eritrea. There is my uncle al-Tijani Sisi whom I tried to contact as soon as I arrived in Asmera by means of a letter that I gave to an official of the Security Service called Musa, and asked him to send it to Cairo for al-Tijani. If and when the letter got to my uncle al-Tijani Sisi, he would inform my other uncle Ibrahim Ahmad Direij. If I met him in Asmera, then I would get the money from him.

Question: What is your relationship with Ibrahim Direij?

Answer: He is my uncle.

Question: On what basis were you thinking of asking him for money?

Answer: I would have told him that I arrived in Eritrea as a refugee and was going through a very difficult time and that I was in Asmera, I was exhausted and my situation was very, very uncertain. If he got such a message, he would sympathize and would promptly assist me.

Question: How much was the material reward that was to be given to you in the event of a successful operation?

Answer: It was a big reward.

Question: Did they specify how much it was?

Answer: They did not tell me it was "so much" but, as Mahir told me: "Let's hope for success. If the operation is a success, we shall both be rich." Mahir is my friend: we are from the same intake, and he is very dear to me. Whenever I am away on a mission, Mahir takes my salary for me. That is how close we are.

Question: Didn't you consider any possibility that the operation would fail?

Answer: On the basis of the information I had gathered, there was no possibility of failure. On this occasion I would like to tell you that I was planning to get married in June. Everything was ready.

Question: So you were sure that the operation would succeed?

Answer: I was absolutely confident that the operation would succeed. I took it for granted that I would carry out the operation and come back to get married.

Question: And what if the operation failed?

Answer: I did not think it would fail but if it did, if I had a feeling that it was going to fail, I would return to the Sudan without any fuss, and not try to carry out the assassination.

Question: How could you assess the chances of the operation not succeeding?

Answer: I would make my own evaluation. I had been doing my own research and following it up. I had been turning over various options and ideas in my own mind and if I thought there was a 95 per cent chance of success and a 5 per cent chance of failure I would abandon the attempt, because I don't want to take a risk. Because of the 5 per cent risk, I would rather do something else based on information I had gathered, and on my own research. I know that I would be included in a list of terrorists and get killed and I am not prepared to tolerate that because I have plans to get married. It follows that I must get back through my own ingenuity. If I didn't succeed I had sworn on the Book to come back and give them the plan. Perhaps they would send other people.

Question: Did you discuss within the Service the possibility that the operation would not be carried out?

Answer: They were confident and didn't give any indication that we might fail. They told me: "We must liquidate Isaias and we are fully confident that we will kill him."

Question: During your interrogation, you said that some Eritreans were selected and sent to Hizbullah. Is that correct information?

Answer: Yes, it is correct.

Question: How many were they and when were they sent?

Answer: This was after the visit of President Rafsanjani of Iran to Khartoum in October. A week after his visit, a company of mujahidin was chosen from among the Eritrean Jihad. It was a mixed company of mujahidin from the Sudan, Chad and Nigeria. There were different nationalities. They were carried by Air France from Dongola airport to Damascus and from there they were transported by vehicles to south Lebanon.

Question: And there were Eritreans among them?

Answer: Yes, there was one company consisting entirely of Eritrean mujahidin and another company which was mixed.

Question: Why did they send them there?

Answer: To wage a holy war to liberate Jerusalem.

Question: Along with Hizbullah?

Answer: Yes, with Hizbullah.

Question: Who were the people who supervised the operation?

Answer: The whole of the political leadership including Dr. Nafi and all the people from the Security Service, including Ibrahim Shams al-Din.

Question: When did this conversation take place?

Answer: It took place in October, a week after the visit of Rafsanjani. That was when the force was transported.

Question: You mentioned earlier that there were camps for different groups of mujahidin in the Sudan. Can you give us details of these camps and say where they are?

Answer: As far as the Eritrean Jihad is concerned, their camps are situated in the east of the Sudan at Girba, Fao and Mahatta Hidasher (Station 11). As far as the Ugandan Lords Resistance Army is concerned, its offices are in Khartoum and their members are recruited in Khartoum, but their training takes place in Juba.

Question: Are their camps in Juba?

Answer: Yes, that's where they are.

Question: What about the Egyptians?

Answer: The Egyptians are trained close to Atbara in an area called Wadi al-Humar. Later they are transferred to the Abu Simbel camp.

Question: How did you get this information?

Answer: I have visited all the camps. The last camp I visited was the Abu Simbel camp of the Egyptian Jihad.

Question: Who visited the camp with you?

Answer: Sheikh Hassan Abdullah al-Turabi.

Question: What was the purpose of the visit?

Answer: It was a visit of inspection. Sheikh Hassan al-Turabi was very upset with the Egyptian mujahidin, on account of their dishonesty, and the fact that they spent a lot of money. He talked about it a great deal. At that time, I remember, there was an incident in Cairo in some hotel or other and a number of Greeks were killed. Sheikh Hassan al-Turabi was talking about that incident.

Question: What facilities are provided for the Jihad camps?

Answer: From us, they receive support in the form of rations and ready cash.

Question: What is the source of the rations and the cash and all the other facilities that you provide?

Answer: It is support provided by Iran.

Question: What type of support is given?

Answer: The support comes from Iran in the form of hard currency, but we give them Sudanese currency.

Question: Where do the weapons come from?

Answer: The weapons are from the Sudan.

Question: But where does the Sudan get them from? What is their main source?

Answer: The weapons come from Iran.

Question: What type are they?

Answer: The explosives are Iranian and Croatian. As for the other weapons, there are Kalashnikovs which come from Iraq. But most of the operations that have taken place in Egypt used weapons provided internally from recruits in Egypt.

Question: You mentioned earlier that you knew of two companies that travelled to south Lebanon. Where did these two companies leave from?

Answer: One left from al-Girba and arrived at Khartoum. It was assumed that the company would depart from Khartoum. However, the plans were changed and they left from Dongola airport.

Question: Why?

Answer: The reason was that Khartoum airport was congested.

Question: Do you mean it was congested in the sense that there was a security risk, and that there were people who might discover what was going on?

Answer: Yes. They changed to Dongola airport and I was to have travelled with them, but, as things turned out, there were circumstances that prevented me from going.

Question: How about the other company?

Answer: The other company was a mixed company of Islamic mujahidin.

Question: How did they transport them from Dongola?

Answer: On board an aircraft leased from France. Actually, the leased planes came to transport emergency food aid to Juba in the south of the Sudan. When the need arose, we used them.

Question: In other words the planes were leased for cargo, but the Government was using them for another purpose, including the Dongola operation?

Answer: The Dongola operation was to take them from Dongola airport to Damascus.

Question: On the subject of the Islamic Front and the regime, we should like to know the role of the leadership of the Islamic Front and of the regime in participation in, and follow-up of, various terrorist missions. What was their role?

Answer: The role of the Islamic Front is to provide leadership in the region. As for the regime, its leaders are the leaders of the Islamic Front. They are the ones who take the decisions, and we just have to carry them out.

Question: We want to know about their role, not yours.

Answer: Their role is to be the thinkers, the leaders.

Question: They have opened the country's doors to terrorism. The question is, how do they supervise those activities?

Answer: There are special people charged with following up such activities. They include Ghazi Salah al-Din, Dr. Nafi Ali Nafi and people such as Ibrahim Shams al-Din, General Omar al-Bashir himself, and people such as Sheikh Hassan al-Turabi. They are the people who run these activities.

Question: How about the aspect of implementation and distribution?

Answer: Implementation and distribution?

Question: Nafi Ali Nafi was in the Security Service and he was appointed as Minister of Agriculture. What is the relationship between Nafi Ali Nafi and the Security Service?

Answer: Dr. Nafi Ali Nafi has never ceased to be our director in the General Security Service. He has never stopped coming: morning, evening, and night. As for his going to the Ministry of Agriculture, I am not aware of that.

Question: Is he always at the Security Service?

Answer: He is always there, it is his instructions that are carried out and he follows up what is done.

Question: You said that 34 members of the Security Service were mobilized; how were they brought together?

Answer: They were mobilized in early November. At that time I was at the head office of Prison Security. Their leader at the time was Mahir al-Tayyib Ahmad. As soon as I had finished, I joined them. As soon as I had met them, lectures began, given by Brigadier Salah Bosh, Abubakr Sharaf al-Din and Mahir al-Tayyib Ahmad. Brigadier Salah Bosh told us to monitor the opposition and the supplies, weapons, ammunition and reinforcements received by the opposition from Israel, the United States and Eritrea, and to note the quantities, and to assess their manpower and leadership. He said that it would be a test to find out whether anyone could not accomplish that task. Everyone said they were willing to carry it out.

Question: When Salah Bosh mobilized the 34 people from the Security Service, which people actually came from the Service?

Answer: They were Brigadier Salah Bosh, Colonel Abubakr Sharaf al-Din and Captain Mahir al-Tayyib Ahmad.

Question: You said earlier that a celebration of the fast-breaking was organized for the group; what was the occasion for that?

Answer: We usually fast on Mondays and Thursdays of each week and the celebration fell on Thursday, 14 November 1996.

Question: Who was present at the celebration?

Answer: Those present were General Omar al-Bashir, General al-Zubir Muhammad Salih, Sheikh Hassan al-Turabi, Sharif al-Din Bannega, Muhammad Ahmad al-Dabi, Hasan Dahri, Bakri Hasan Salih and Hasan Salih (Director of Positive Security). Also there were Majzub al-Khalifa (Governor of Khartoum),

Badr al-Din Taha (former Governor), Ibrahim Shams al-Din and a number of foreign friends, Iranians, Afghans and Palestinians.

Question: Is such a celebration organized every week on Mondays and Thursdays?

Answer: Yes, every Monday and Thursday, after a day of fasting.

Question: You said that, after the fast-breaking, there were prayers for all those who were leaving; what was the reason for that?

Answer: There were prayers for those who were leaving because some of them might not come back. The Service has sustained heavy losses abroad. That is why prayers are said for those who are going away and who may be interrogated and tortured to death.

Question: Were any speeches made?

Answer: Not much was said. We prayed for those who were going away and after that we shouted, 'Hail, Muhammad.' Then we immediately departed.

Question: You presented yourself as being an officer. Tell us how you did that.

Answer: It was part of the leadership's plan. The information available to the leadership was that the Sudanese Alliance Forces were made up of various intakes from the army. They therefore classified the officers and found that the whole of the intake on training course No. 8 was in the Service, apart from four who were in the Department of National Welfare and were merchants inside the Sudan. That was why they told me to claim to have belonged to training course No. 8.

Question: Did they give you information about training course No. 8?

Answer: Yes, I did get information about it. I was trained in Gebet and graduated in 1985. They gave me the names of people in many intakes and I have memorized some of them, including the four who were in the Department of National Welfare.

Question: What was behind the selection of training course No. 8?

Answer: It was because all of them were still in the Service. In addition, those who were in the Department of National Welfare and in the Sudan never went abroad. That was why they told me to claim that I belonged to them. It was because they were convinced that the Alliance Forces consisted of all intakes.

Question: You mentioned in your statement that, after you were charged with the mission on account of which you came here, a recording was made of your confession at the instigation of General Salah Bosh. Will you tell us about the confession?

Answer: The confession was recorded on 12 November at a time when I had taken three days' leave of absence. On 12 November Mahir al-Tayyib telephoned me and said that the brigadier wanted to see me. So I agreed and when I met him he greeted me and took out a piece of paper with some writing on it which I proceeded to read. I said, "What is this, sir?" And he said, "We want to make a video recording of this statement made by you personally." I said, "What is the purpose of that?" And he replied, "It is part of a plan we have devised. You must read it onto the tape." I said to him, "This does not make sense to me. If you don't trust me, take me off the mission." He said, "No, you are first and foremost a human being, and second you will be going with a team. It is possible that a member of the team will be interrogated by a security service and will tell the story. And you yourself might be arrested and confess as well. In the event that you do so, this cassette will be documentary evidence for us and will be a defence for you." I said, "How can it be a defence?" And he replied, "It will be a defence both for the State and for you personally." I said, "All right, but there is no time now and I'm mentally exhausted. I need time to memorize the statement before recording it." He said, "There is no problem. We'll write it on a blackboard." So they wrote it up on a blackboard behind the camera and I made the recording.

Question: What was the confession about?

Answer: The statement was to the effect that: "I personally belonged to the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and was involved in a plot devised by the NDA to assassinate General Omar al-Bashir on his visit to the Central African Republic in the month of Ramadan 1996. We are a group under the supervision of a certain Yasir Arman, and our action was initiated from Aswan in Egypt. It was an Egyptian plan and was supported by Egypt. Our group arrived in Faya-Largeau in northern Chad and from there we travelled to Dabba. The plan failed and I was arrested on the border between Chad and the Central African Republic. I was taken to Khartoum and was imprisoned there for eight months, after which I was released under a general amnesty."

Question: In connection with the general amnesty under which you were supposedly released, would you have had to undertake any obligation?

Answer: Yes. We would have sworn an oath. It is usual for anyone who is released to be made to swear an oath and they made me swear the same oath, as follows: "In the name of God, I swear that I will be true to the revolution of national salvation and that I will not carry out any subversive act against the revolution of national salvation, or any act of sabotage detrimental to the citizens or the nation, and that I will be true to the revolution of national salvation and will not disclose anything that I saw during my imprisonment."

Question: What was the role of Colonel Abubakr Sharaf al-Din in the operation?

Answer: His role was to be General Manager of the operation. He financed it and was the chief person responsible for it and reported to the head of the Service.

Question: In order to carry out the operation you would have needed weapons. Where were you going to obtain the weapons for use in carrying out the mission?

Answer: I was to join the Alliance Forces, which are an armed organization. So I could get weapons from them and keep them until the mission was accomplished.

Question: How do you mean?

Answer: The vehicles used to undertake the mission and to travel from the front lines to Asmera had to carry weapons. So I could therefore find a way of obtaining weapons.

Question: Why did the regime work to assassinate President Isaias Afwerki?

Answer: The regime is very concerned that President Isaias Afwerki is in power because the Eritrean regime, or the Eritrean Government, has given shelter to the Sudanese opposition and has allocated them territory and provides them with support and with additional military expertise. For that reason, the Government decided to liquidate Isaias Afwerki on the grounds that the assassination might create political confusion in Eritrea which would be of benefit to the National Islamic Front.